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COMMUNITY
Human persons find themselves placed
in a variety of relationships and associations with one another. These relationships and associations constitute community to the extent that they enable those
who are so related to share common interests, intentions, purposes, sentiments, or
understanding, and/or to participate in
common activities. Although "community" can be treated in certain contexts as
synonymous with "society," it is frequently
taken.to encompass bonds of affective and
personal commitment among its members
that enable their interactions and relationships to be conceived in terms that are less
formally and institutionally structured than those generally connoted by the term
"society." In this use, "community" still includes reference to the range of human associations and relationships for which
society is considered to provide a more formal institutional structure.
When "community" is understood in
this most generic sense, a person can be a
participant in more than one community;
these various communities can be differ-
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entiated from one a nother with respect
to what they enable their participants to
share. One can thus belong, at the same
time, to the cultural community of one's
ethnic and linguistic heritage, to the civic
community of this town or nation, to the
intimate community of one's family and
friends, to the worshiping community of
this congregation or parish, to the working
community of one's particular occupation, trade, or profession, as well as to any
number of communities delimited by
their participants' shared interests and activities in art, music, sports, and the like.
In this context of multiple participation,
the particular communities of which one
is a member may each carry d iffe rent
weight with reference to the fundamental
moral significance and function of community. "Community" can be defined, in
this .sense, as that set of relationships that
provides the primary locus for the fo rmation of a person's identity as a moral agent
in relation to all others; this formation
encompasses the development of those
modes of understanding, intention, affection, and action that enable one to participate in the activities that sustain the
relationships that provide the bases for
the community' s existence, identity, and
attainment of its end(s).
In its presentation and explication of
the moral significance and function of
community, Catholic social thought has
developed particular emphases upon
themes that show how community stands
in direct and intrinsic relationship to a
proper and adequate understanding of the
human person. The philosophical exposition of these themes, generally set within a
conceptual framework of natural law, ·has
most often given primary focus to concepts, considerations, and arguments that
(I) explicate and ground the claim that
human persons are intrinsically social and
(2) elaborate the implications this claim
has for the ordering of human social activity. These implications have been framed
principally in terms of the constitution

and function of social institutions and the
delimitation of the ways that members of
a community appropriately participate in
the workings of such institutions. Among
these institutions the family takes primacy as "a kind of school of deeper hu- ....1manity" and "the foundation of society"
(Gaudium et spes 52). The theological exposition of these themes has principally
clustered around a varied but interrelated
set of concepts, images, and symbols-for
example, creation, covenant, koinonia,
kingdom of God-that also affirm an intrinsically-social character to human existence but that also explicitly root this
human exigency toward community in the
graciousness of God's salvific activity. In
consequence, the church receives special
consideration within this theological exposition, since it is understood as the
community that preeminently owes its
existence to God's salvific initiatives
(Lumen gentium 2).
Within both philosophical and theological expositions of the moral significance
and function of community, the concept
of the dignity of the human person has
played an especially prominent role. The
Genesis account (I :26-27) of the creation
of the human person in God's image
(imago Dei) stands as the starting point
for theological treatment of the concept of
human dignity (GS 12; ~conomic Justice
for A/132). Three aspects of this treatment
are of particular importance in the elaboration of the intrinsically social character
of human existence and its rootedness
in God's salvific activity: ( l) an insistence
that the full acknowledgment and
achievement of this dignity for individuals is possible only within the context of
each one's membership and participation
in the life of a community (GS 24-27); (2)
the correlation of the source of human
dignity in God's gracious act of creation
with the final destiny-sharing in God's
own life- to which humanity is called and
which requires the active cooperation of
human persons (GS 34; Popu/orum pro-
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gressio l 5-17); (3) the identification of
the conditions for the acknowledgment
and attainment of this dignity with the
protection of the full range-political,
economic, and social-of human rights
and with the exercise of the corresponding
responsibilities to others that these rights
entail (Pacem in terris 35).
To the extent that Catholic social
thought has cast its philosophical discussion of the intrinsically social character of
the human person in terms of Aristotelian
and Thomistic categories, it has viewed
the concept of human dignity and its bearing upon the moral significance and function of community in terms of a finality
that is inherent to human persons. This finality has its ultimate focus upon the attainment of a personal communion with
God that enables and perfects our communion with one another as well as with
the whole order of creation; it also encompasses a range of specific and limited
goods that play an essential role in the
constitution of the authentic human good
possible for us to attain within the finite
conditions of human existence (GS 39).
This finality also assigns to the common
good a special ordering function in the attainment of the authentic human good,
particularly with respect to the concrete
workings of human social, political, and
economic institutions. As an ordering
principle, the common good is neither
the mere sum total of the goods sought by
individuals nor is it the good of the
whole- be it a particular community or
the entire human species-for which individual parts may be sacrificed. " It is the
good human life of the multitude, of a
multitude of persons; it is their communion in good living. It is therefore common to both the whole and the parts into
which it flows back and which, in turn,
must benefit from it" (Maritain, p. 41 ).
This placement of the meaning and attainment of human dignity within an account of human good, which aspires to
comprehend its plurality through the or-

dering principle of the common good;
stands in contrast with an understanding
of the dignity of the person that takes the
freedom of individuals to make their own
choices to be its central, if not sole, constitutive feature. This latter understanding
of human dignity has played an important
role in the establishment and operation of
the institutions of Western liberal democracy: autonomy, that is, the freedom of individual self-determination, functions as
a central conceptual underpinning for the
social-contract views that have generally
been taken, in popular as well as academic
argument, as both the morally appropriate and practically persuasive justification for these institutions and for the
individual's participation in them. One
consequence of such social-contract views
has been to place the exercise of an individual's freedom of self-dett:rmination in
strong tension, if not inevitable conflict,
with the responsibilities that membership
in a community and participation in its
institutions entail for the individual. In
particular, to the extent that contractarian
views make the moral significance and
function of social relationships turn upon
questions of whether and to what extent
the origin of such relationships lies in the
free self-determination of individuals,
these views also place at the moral periphery one's membership and participation
in communities whose bonds of relationship' are matters that are not readily and
simply subject to free self-determination,
for example, ties of family, language, ethnicity, and culture.
The mutual and intrinsic relationship
of community to the value and dignity of
the person, which is central in the development of Catholic social thought, has
provided a basis for both the implicit and
explicit criticisms that church pronouncements have made of both the contractarian understanding of the social relationships that undergird human community and the atomistic individualism it
serves to encourage (e.g., PT 78; GS 74;
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.Octogesima adveniens 26, 35). These criticisms are set within a framework that acknowledges the value offreely undertaken
human associations and the centrality of
consent for the moral legitimacy of political authority within any particular human
community (GS 75; OA 45-46). Presupposed is an understanding of the dynamics of human freedom in which the value
of the exercise of human freedom is measured not merely by its satisfaction of the
principle of individual autonomy but also
by its congruence with an intrinsic ordering of human persons to participation in
common good.
The understanding of the dynamics of
human freedom that is presupposed in
Catholic social thought on community
has been paralleled in important ways by a
set of challenges that a number of thinkers, both secular and religious, have recently posed to the cultural and academic
dominance of a contractarian understanding of the moral character of social
relationships. These challenges have frequently been taken to function as a "communitarian" critique of contractarian
views. Consonant with an affirmation of
an intrinsic mutual relationship between
the persons and community, these authors
have encouraged a retrieval of the idea of
common good: the " public argument"
(Murray, p. 8) that constitutes the civic
and civil moral conversation at the heart
of the reflective life of a community must
have the common good as its focus, particularly as that argument bears upon decisions and actions that affect the life and
well being of each and all the members of
· the community.
In addition to encouraging this retrieval of the common good, certain versions of the communitarian critique have
also proposed a narrative mode of understanding as the most appropriate way to
comprehend the structure of the intrinsic
mutual relationship between persons and
community. Within this mode of understanding, learning the narratives that ex-

hibit the finalities embedded in the constitutive practices of the community and
acquiring the skills requisite for participation in those practices are the primary activities that shape a person's identitymost crucially, one's identity as a moral
agent. The moral identity of persons is
thus primarily located by reference to the
practices, including those of reflective
inquiry, in which one participates as a
member of a particular community and
which constitute that community's moral
tradition.
The narrative approach to understanding community as the matrix for the formation of the moral identity of its members frequently places great stress upon
the historical particularity of the moral
tradition that the practices of any community embody; in consequence, its account
of community stands vulnerable to
charges that it does not offer an adequate
basis upon which universal moral claims
that bind all persons can be pressed. This
criticism, on the philosophical side, sees
in the narrative approach no more than
yet another formulation of moral relativism; on the theological side, it sees the
narrative approach limiting the applicability of crucial Christian moral claims to
those who are within the ambit of sectarian community.
However, this narrative- approach also
offers possibilities for enriching a number
of the concepts and themes involved in
the continuing development of Catholic
thought on community. For instance, this
approach helps to underscore the importance that the church, precisely as a worshiping community, plays in the formation
of moral identity. The enacted events, images, and stories that constitute the worship of the Christian community mediate
to its participants the salvific activity of
God and have power to shape the moral
agency of those who worship so that their
dispositions, actions, and affections may
more and more be drawn into accord with
the responsive pattern of agency that is
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most fully exhibited in Jesus Christ. A second possibility for enrichment lies in the
accounts of the dynamics of tradition that
the narrative approach has been required
to develop in response to criticism that the
historical particularity of the moral practice and the reflective moral inquiry of any
community does not offer an adequate
basis on which to press universal moral
claims. Of particular interest are those accounts (e.g., Alasdair Macintyre's Whose
Justice? Which Rationality.'!) in which
maintaining and developing a viable moral
tradition requires commitment, on the
part of those who represent the traditions
of their particular communities, to sustain
and take part in a continuing public conversation with one another about our common human good, that is, a commitment
to engage in what John Courtney Murray
characterizes as "public argument."
There are a number. of other current
philosophical and theological discussions
that also offer potential resources for the
enrichment of Catholic thought on community. Three that deserve particular attention can be briefly noted here. First,
theological proposals to interpret the relations among the persons of the Trinity on
the model of community suggest that the
fundamentally social character of the
human person created in the image of God
has its roots not just in God's act of creation but also in the Trinitarian life of
God. Second, both feminist and liberation
thinkers have explored the positive and the
negative dimensions of the ways in which
the social location of individuals, the ideological commitments embedded in a particular culture, and the structure of relationships of power within a society all
function in the formation of the identity of
persons. Although they join their voices to
the sharp criticism that Catholic social
thought has leveled at contractarian understandings of social relationships having
atomistic individualism at their base, feminist and liberation thinkers also fault
Catholic thought for containing under-

standings of community that presuppose
hierarchical models for the structuring of
social institutions and relationships. These
models are seen as inevitably functioning
to exclude those at the margins of community from participation in the determination of their own destinies. An important
basis for such criticism has been a model of
human connectedness in which solidarity
with those who are powerless and outcast
forms a touchstone with which to test the
moral adequacy of a community's institutions and practices. Third, ecological and
environmental concerns have suggested
significant ways in which our thinking
about community may need to include not
only our relationships to one another as
persons but also our relationships to all animate life and its environing world.
See a/so
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